Looking back in space and time

The 17th-century Syrian poet Fatḥ Allāh Ibn al-Naḥḥās (فتح الله ابن النحاس) was regarded as one of the two best poets of his time. Although this particular period of Arabic literature has been ignored and disregarded as an age of decadence, prolixity, and baroque ornamentation (the so-called ‘aṣr al-inḥiṭāṭ, عصر الانحطاط), it is becoming increasingly clear that this is a case of people selectively rewriting history by privileging certain parts and certain elements over others. 

I’m not taking a definite stance here because I don’t know enough about both sides, but after having read Ibn al-Naḥḥās’s beautiful qaṣīdah “He saw blame pouring in from all sides, and it scared him” (ِرأی اللومَ من كلِّ الجهات فَراعَهُ), I think we do ourselves a great injustice by writing off a giant period of time as entirely lacking in poetic merit. This one line, where Ibn al-Naḥḥās talks about how he is forced to leave Aleppo after a scandal involving him and his (male) beloved, is just gorgeous:

فَرُحْتُ وَسَيْري خَطْوَةٌ وَالْتِفاتَةُ ❊ إلى فائتٍ مِنْهُ أُرَجِّي ارْتِجاعَهُ

So I left; and every for’ard step was a glance backward

Looking for a lost past, whose return was the thing I craved.

I’ve committed the cardinal sin of trying to emulate the rhythm of the ṭawīl meter in English, which I fear has straitjacketed my translation. But perhaps this may give you some sense of how cleverly, and poignantly, Ibn al-Naḥḥās is able to play with the ideas of looking backward in space—towards a city he loves, in which dwells the young man he loves, who has chosen not to come bid him farewell; and in time—towards a past when they were together, when all was well. And, perhaps most interestingly, with the idea that looking vainly backward in space for his missing beloved is also looking vainly forward in time for a lovers’ reunion that will never be. 

Appayya Dīkṣita on figurative language

(This post is a draft, and I will likely edit my translations below, multiple times.)

In his Vṛttivārttika (“An Explication of Linguistic Operations”), Appayya Dīkṣita briefly outlines his theory of semantics, focusing on the processes by which words give rise to different meanings. As befits a good ālaṅkārika, literary theorist, in the post-Ānandavardhana universe, he accepts three such operations: 

• abhidhā, “denotation”,
• lakṣaṇā, “figuration” or something similar, and 
• vyañjanā, “suggestion”. 

This work of his, though, only defines abhidhā and lakṣaṇā. Does that mean the Vṛttivārttika is incomplete? Or is it the case that Appayya wanted to focus only on these two, postponing discussion of the often-problematic vyañjanā? Things are unclear, but what we do know is that in his other works (see the many articles by Yigal Bronner on Appayya) Appayya wants to reduce the role taken up by dhvani in poetics, and it is possible that this also means he wants to give abhidhā and lakṣaṇā more importance than post-Mammaṭa alaṅkāraśāstra permits.

Now, Appayya Dīkṣita argues that there are seven subtypes of lakṣaṇā. (This is one more than Mukulabhaṭṭa defines in his Abhidhāvṛttimātṛkā. One reason Mukulabhaṭṭa was so expansive was because he entirely denied the existence of a separate linguistic operation called vyañjanā, trying instead to bring it entirely under the domain of lakṣaṇā. I wonder what this says about Appayya’s intentions?) He offers examples for each of them, and some day I will try to list them all out systematically. For now, though, I restrict myself to his last two subtypes of lakṣaṇā, both of which he exemplifies using the single verse offered below.

ā pādam ā cikura-bhāram aśeṣam aṅgam 
ānanda-bṛnda-lasitaṃ sudṛśām asīmam |
antar mama sphuratu santatam antarātmann
ambhoja-locana tava śrita-hasti-śailam ||

śuddha-sâropa-lakṣaṇā yathā ‘ā pādam’ iti | atra bhagavad-aṅgeṣv ānanda-kāritvena ānanda-padasya sāropa-lakṣaṇā | ānanda-karaṇe itara-vailakṣaṇya-dyotanaṃ phalam |  ānanda-kāriṇi viṣaya-nigaraṇena “ānando ’yam” iti prayoge sâdhyavasāya-lakṣaṇā | ānandâvyabhicāra-dyotanaṃ phalam  ||

From feet up to thick, curly locks,
May Your entire body
        shimmering endlessly with clusters of pure bliss
        for those with blessed sight,
shine resplendent eternally within me,

O Indweller of my soul,
Lotus-eyed Lord 
         who lives atop Elephant Hill!

Śuddhā sâropā lakṣaṇā is exemplified in the verse that begins with the words ā pādam. Here, the word ānanda (“bliss”) refers to the Lord’s limbs through sâropā lakṣaṇā, because of their being causers of bliss. The result is the illumination of the impossibility of any other thing being an instrument of bliss.

The word ānanda refers to a causer of bliss through sâdhyavasāya-lakṣaṇā via the usage “it is bliss”, because in that case the topic at hand (i.e., the causer of bliss) gets wholly subsumed by the description (i.e., bliss). The result of this is the illumination of the total non-deviation of bliss from the causer of bliss.


What Appayya Dīkṣita does not mention is the source of his example verse. It turns out to be the 105th, and last, verse of the Śrī Varadarāja Stava, his long, highly poetically ornate praise-poem dedicated to Lord Varadarāja, the form of Viṣṇu manifested in the temple icon at Elephant Hill in the city of Kanchipuram, Appayya Dīkṣita’s hometown.

“Two things stand like stone”

The words of the Australian poet Adam Lindsay Gordon ring especially true in these times:

Life is mostly froth and bubble;

Two things stand like stone—

Kindness in another’s trouble,

Courage in your own.

“Practical” Universities

David Brooks has a new column out in the New York Times in which he argues that online education will force a transformation of universities. Drawing on Michael Oakeshott, he argues (or really, just states) that universities today offer two kinds of knowledge: technical (the what) and practical (the how). Brooks claims that, because technical knowledge can easily be transmitted online, we will see people gravitating towards MOOCs where they pick up “just the facts, ma’am” from star online teachers. However, since practical knowledge can only be picked up from experience, he thinks that universities will shift increasingly towards offering this sort of irreplaceable knowledge.

Leaving aside the merits and demerits of Brooks’s piece, I am quite intrigued that he ignores another, crucial, kind of knowledge that universities offer: the why. Now sometimes this knowledge seems like anti-knowledge from the outside, because it is about limits, about ends, and about asking the right kinds of questions. But these are critical issues to think about—admittedly, not for everybody, but for society as a whole. A city full of carpenters, or of philosophers, is not a city but an unnatural monoculture.

This is all the more surprising because a threefold distinction of knowledge was known to Aristotle, who called them epistemē, technē, and phronesis. (Of these three, phronesis directly overlaps with Brooks’s practical knowledge; while technē seems to largely make up, but not exactly correspond to, technical knowledge.) A polis needs all three to flourish. I am curious to know where Brooks thinks epistemē will be found in his post-MOOC world.

On deduction, induction, and abduction (aka “Sherlock Holmes and the Mysterious Case of Fat Ted”): Part One

I had a mini-meltdown in my favorite bookstore last night. “Never judge a book by its cover,” or so they say, but when a book by an academic psychologist claiming to help us become more like Sherlock Holmes in our reasoning states on the inside flap that Sherlock Holmes used “logical deduction” to solve his cases, I jolly well reserve the right to judge the book by its inside flap. Yes, I realize that these things are seldom written by the authors themselves; and it is almost certain that some harebrained editor probably wrote that absurdity; but the Amazon reviews make it clear that the author herself is quite confused about the differences among deduction, induction, and abduction. Worse yet, there are now reviews of this book in places like the Boston Globe that continue to perpetrate this abominable deception that Holmes used logical deduction. Really, if you want to teach people to reason correctly, you’d better start with the rectification of names.

I have no time right now to flesh this out, but I most certainly will get to this in the next few days. Once my hands stop trembling. 

(Bonus points if you can “logically deduce” where I’m going with this series of posts based on its title!)