Annambhaṭṭa on svârtha- and parârthânumāna

The Naiyāyikas, like every other philosophical “school” in India with the notable exception of the Cārvākas, accept that anumāna, the method of inference, is capable of giving rise to jñāna, an episode of knowledge—specifically, anumiti-jñāna, an inferential knowledge-episode. (Loosely translating jñāna as “knowledge” misrepresents the Naiyāyika position.) Interestingly, the Naiyāyikas hold that there are two kinds of anumāna: svârthânumāna (inferring for oneself) and parârthânumāna (literally, “inferring for another”). The latter makes no sense in English—how can one infer something for somebody else? It may make more sense to think of parârthânumāna as “proof” or “demonstration”.

Here is what Annambhaṭṭa has to say on the matter.

anumānaṃ dvividham — (1) svârthaṃ (2) parârthaṃ ca ||


(1) svârthaṃ svânumiti-hetuḥ, tathā hi svayam eva bhūyo darśanena “yatra yatra dhūmas tatra tatrâgnir” iti mahānasâdau vyāptiṃ gṛhītvā parvata-samīpaṃ tad-gate câgnau sandihānaḥ parvate dhūmaṃ paśyan vyāptiṃ smarati — “yatra yatra dhūmas tatra tatra vahnir” iti  | tad-anantaraṃ “vahni-vyāpya-dhūmavān ayaṃ parvataḥ” iti jñānam utpadyate | ayam eva liṅga-parāmarśa ity ucyate | tasmāt “parvato vahnimān” iti jñānânumitir utpadyate, tad etat svârthânumānam ||

(2) yat tu svayaṃ dhūmād agnim anumāya paraṃ prati bodhayituṃ pañcâvayava-vākyaṃ prayujyate tat parârthânumānam | yathā — 
(a) parvato vahnimān [pratijñā]
(b) dhūmavattvād [hetu]
(c) yo yo dhūmavān sa vahnimān yathā mahānasam [udāharaṇa]
(d) tathā câyaṃ [upanaya]
(e) tasmāt tathêti [nigamana] | 
anena pratipāditāl liṅgāt paro ’py agniṃ pratipadyate || 



Inference is of two kinds: (1) self-directed inference and (2) other-directed inference, or “proving”.


(1) Self-directed inference is the cause for our personal inferential knowledge. After repeated personal observation, Jack grasps the co-occurrence of fire and smoke in locations like kitchens, i.e., the pervasion relation “where there’s smoke, there’s fire”. Then, while near a mountain, Jack sees smoke there. Suspecting that there may be a fire there, he remembers the rule of co-occurrence: “Where there’s smoke, there’s fire.” Immediately after this arises the knowledge “on this mountain there is smoke that co-occurs with fire.” This is what is called reflection on inferential markers. Thus arises the inferential knowledge “there is fire on the mountain”, and this is what is called self-directed inference.


(2) After Jack infers the fire from the smoke, he uses the five-part sentence to convey it to Jill. That five-part sentence is the demonstration. Here, 

(a) there is fire on the mountain [the statement]

(b) because there is smoke there [the reason]:

(c) wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in the kitchen [the example];

(d) the same correlation applies here [the application], 

(e) and therefore the same result applies here [the conclusion].

Jack thus conveys the fire to Jill from the inferential mark, which is conveyed by this sentence.