Islamic Philosophy and Theology, II: The First Caliphs

Part I: The Umayyads

I'm missing a few pages at the very beginning of the book, which is frustrating because I'm missing a lot of the details about the early debates and struggles during the earliest Caliphates. This is one part where I really need more information to fill in the gaps, so please help me out. What I've been able to piece together so far is that after the passing of the Prophet Muḥammad, the Caliphate passed on to Abū Bakr, `Umar, `Uthmān, and `Alī in succession, and not without much debate that eventually had unfortunate, violent consequences.

The book begins by noting, not the mainstream of Islamic belief and practice, but the rise of different sects. The author justifies this later when he actually gets down to the "general religious movement" as he calls it, by noting:

(1) that the term "orthodox" is inaccurate when applied to Islamic practice at this early stage, because after the Prophet there was no single authority to turn to in order to determine the "orthodox" from the "heretical"; this, he feels, would be imposing a Christian understanding of religion onto Islamic history. What Islam has instead, he says, is "the main or central body of opinion in the various schools or sections of the community." (p. 19)

(2) that the study of the central movement of moderate opinion during the Umayyad period is difficult to document because it was, and generally has been, the practice of Muslim historians and heresiographers to note down heresies, better termed as "innovations" (bid'a). In other words,

"Muslims of the centre were quite happy to write about the divergent views of the sects; but when it came to the views of their own party they considered that these were in essence identical with those of Muḥammad and his Companions, and therefore they tended to hide any changes and developments or pass them over in silence. There is thus no material for the direct study of this central body, but only large masses of semi-relevant material in biographical dictionaries and similar works." (p. 19)

This doesn't mean that there was no central movement, of course, but merely that to determine what it was and what it thought at that early stage is a fairly difficult task.

I understand that the selection of the Caliphs after the Prophet was not uncontroversial, and that the selection and consequent governance of the Caliph `Uthmān was particularly thorny. Watt dates the rise of the first sectarian tensions to this period, both rooted in opposition to `Uthmān's caliphate.

The Shī`ites were of course the party in support of `Alī, who were unwavering in their belief in him and who believed that "a leader or imam such as `Alī could make no mistakes and do no wrong." (p. 2) Whether this was the absolute belief of every single member of this movement at this point in history or the opinion of the most fervent is unclear. Watt seems to imply that at this very early point, within`Alī's lifetime, the Shī`ite movement is not a full-blown political and theological movement but rather a collection of Muslims who believe that he ought to have been made Caliph first.

The other sect that arises in opposition to `Uthmān is that of the Khārijites. Unlike the Shī`ites, they believed that `Alī had actually erred "because he was not sufficiently definite in his support of those responsible for the murder of `Uthmān." (p. 2) In other words, they considered `Uthmān's actions unjust (precisely what he did, I don't know since the pages are missing!), and believed that as a result of this injustice he had forfeited his membership of the entire community of Muslims, and hence it was justified, even required, to assassinate him. According to them,

"judgement was to be given in accordance with the Qur'ān. This further implied that all who had committed a grave sin were destined for Hell and belonged to the 'people of Hell', since in the Khārijite view this was clearly stated in the Qur'ān." (p. 8)

This picture of the Khārijites that Watt draws definitely seems to be an extreme version of their belief, but it does seem to explain why the Khārijites mounted so many rebellions against `Uthmān, then `Alī, and then Mu`āwīya.

At this early point, the two sects are not yet theologically well defined positions, but are probably better understood as social or political movements seeking a form of justice that was regarded by the mainstream as unusual or unacceptable. To account for the rise of these two disaffected groups, Watt seeks out differences in social structure that may have helped assuage the concerns of Muslims at the time. He argues that since the period was marked by major social upheavals, men sought succor in traditional sources of comfort. To some, this was offered by the promise of following a divinely inspired, infallible, and charismatic leader; to others, this was acquired through membership in a divinely inspired community of fellow believers. Both of these beliefs, he argues, were present in one way or another in pre-Islamic Arab society. Further, he asserts that the majority of the very first Shī`ites came mostly from southern Arabian tribes, which had a fairly long history of civilization relying on semi-divine kingship, while most of the Khārijites were from northern nomadic tribes that expressed a more "democratic" nature within the tribe in combination with sharp divides between tribes; hypothetically, these old cultural differences may have risen anew to create the new sects.

While the idea that the tribes' pre-Islamic cultures may have influenced their understanding and their practice of Islam is certainly interesting and well within the realms of possibility, I find the general set-up of his explanation a little far-fetched. For if that were the case, then shouldn't the tribes have defected en masse to the new sectarian movements? If one argues that only those who were more deeply attached to their old tribal ways of thinking followed this path, then that naturally raises the question of why these particular individuals were more deeply attached, and why they demonstrated (whether consciously or unconsciously) their affinities by adopting such positions with regard to Islam. Furthermore, it does nothing to answer why it was `Alī in particular who became the focus of one of the sects. I think it is more likely that in the Shī`ite case, individuals were prompted to support `Alī by the perceived injustice meted out to him or by his personal charisma. As for the Khārijites, Watt notes that most of their uprisings against both `Alī and Mu`āwīya were carried out by very small groups of men—an average of two hundred or so. A group this small can coalesce fairly easy (particularly if it has a few strong personalities) based on a perceived common injustice or fraternal bond; and with groups this small I can see Watt's tribal psychology playing its part in convincing them to narrow the limits of the Muslim community down to their own membership. (I'm still not fully satisfied with his explanation though!)