Islamic Philosophy and Theology, IV: The Umayyad-era Shī`ites

The Shī`ites during Umayyad Rule

As can be imagined, the Shī`ites would have been very unhappy under Umayyad rule, first with Mu`āwīya himself (since they blamed him for `Alī's death), and then with Yazīd for the slaughter of Ḥusayn at Karbala. Watt presents a sad picture of the movement at this point, but claims that at this early stage the later theologies of the Imām had not developed. At this point in history, he says, the Shī`ites were a movement of deeply dissatisfied Muslims who were extremely unhappy with the existing Caliphate and were in search of a charismatic leader who could lead them out of this situation. Interestingly, Watt argues that

"there was no particular recognition that the imāms later acknowledged by the Imāmite and Ismā`īlite branches of Shī`ism, the descendants of al-Ḥusayn, son of `Alī, had any special status or special gifts. The tendency was rather to consider that the charismata requisite for the position of imām belonged potentially to all members of Muḥammad's clan of Hāshim, whether descended from Muḥammad through Fāṭima or not." (p. 16)

As evidence for this, he offers the statements made by the leaders of some of the early Shī`ite revolts who often claim descent from Muḥammad not through Fāṭima.

Watt also brings out a very interesting social dimension to the Shī`ite movement at this point. At this point in the history of Islam, there existed a sharp divide between Muslims who were Arabs and Muslims who were from the conquered populations—native `Irāqis, Persians, and the like. The initial solution was to establish an unequal relationship between the Arabs and the native populations wherein the non-Arab Muslims were taken as mawālis or "clients" of the Arabs, under their protection. This undoubtedly protected the earliest converts from repercussions from their societies (and indeed this may have been the original goal, but Watt does not elaborate), but at the same time it introduced a power dynamic that was not to the benefit of the mawālis. As it turns out, one of the earliest Shī`ite rebellions, that of al-Mukhtār in Kufa from AD 685 to 687, was supported by a number of mawālis, and although this rebellion failed it gave both Shī`ites and mawālis reason to work more closely with each other. It's possible that the ethnic tension between Arabs and non-Arabs was mapped onto the tensions between "protector" and "client", "pro-Umayyad" and "anti-Umayyad", "mainstream" and "Shī`ite". None of these divisions was probably deep enough on its own—the majority of the population of Persian stock, who would have converted en masse to Shī`ism very early on had this been true, remained part of the mainstream moderate movement until the Safavids—, but when two or more faultlines coincided, it probably caused the conflict to escalate. The relationship between Shī`ism and the suppressed underclasses remained fairly strong, and I hypothesize that this is one reason the Iranian Islamic Revolution succeeded in tying together many Marxist and Islamic elements (at least so far as I can tell from my cursory readings).

Of the many Shī`ite rebellions at this point, one led by Zayd, the great-grandson of the Prophet, in 740 is important because it gives rise to the Zaydites (or Zaidis, I suppose). What was interesting about this revolt was that Zayd wanted to offer a viable alternative to the Umayyad regime, and to do so, made a few major theological points: first, that the Imām would declare himself openly and be able to back up his words on the battlefield, if necessary; second, that "though `Alī was the rightful imām after the Prophet and superior to Abū Bakr and `Umar, the 'imamate of the inferior' (imāmat al-mafḍūl) was permissible." (p. 17) These were both major differences from the general Shī`ite consensus at this point, and possibly cost Zayd support among more "thorough-going Shī`ites".

And what about the `Abbāsids? Watt presents them as coming to power atop the crest of a popular wave of discontent astutely channeled by the leaders to accomplish their goals. The `Abbāsid rebels appealed to all major discontents in the populace—the Shī`ites, by claiming they "called for support for 'him of the family of the Prophet who shall be chosen," (p. 18), a statement both clearly Shī`ite and yet vague enough to be politically useful; the Zaydites, by claiming that they meant to revenge themselves on the regime for shedding Zayd's blood; and the mawālis, by claiming they were fighting for the weak and downtrodden. Watt notes that the leading military commander of the `Abbāsid rebel forces was a mawāli by the name Abū Muslim; Katherine Babayan studies him and the medieval romance in his name, the Abūmuslimnāma, in greater detail in her book Mystics, Monarchs, and Messiahs: Cultural Landscapes of Early Modern Iran, and notes the convergence of Shī`ite and Zoroastrian rebellion in the mythicized figure of Abū Muslim. Alas, Watt does not mention that after the `Abbāsids came to power, Abū Muslim was murdered. Still, Watt observes that "the volume of support for the `Abbāsids from the clients meant that, when they achieved control over the caliphate, clients, especially Persians and persianized Aramaeans, received a due share of power, and the inferior status of the non-Arab Muslims gradually disappears." (p. 18)

Watt does not have a great opinion of the position of the Shī`ite movement at this point in history, particularly from a theological perspective. He comments:

"The Shī`ism of the Umayyad period was thus vaguer and more indefinite than later Shī`ism, and lacked any semblance of a coherent theory. It was the manifestation of a deep unconscious need—a feeling in men's hearts that they would be happier and more satisfied spiritually if they had a charismatic leader to follow. The imām of whom the Shī`ites dreamed is precisely what is meant by such a charismatic leader … Most of those accepted as imām belied the hopes set on them; and yet the quest went on. The persistence of the quest shows the depth of the feeling involved." (pp. 16–17)

Watt does not try to answer why the Khārijites were quicker to develop something like a fairly clear theology than the Umayyad-era Shī`ites, but I wonder if the size of the respective groups and their attitudes towards authority have something to do with it. Going with Watt's account, I posit that most of the Khārijites were concentrated in fairly small bands, particularly among the extreme Azraqites. A small, ideologically committed group that has already carried out acts of violence that separate it from the mainstream is probably more likely to develop a coherent argument to justify its raison d'être than a diffuse, multivocal movement like the Shī`ites. Further, the attitude of the Khārijites that any Muslim regardless of background or tribal affiliation could become the leader based on personal purity and excellence was probably quite helpful in legitimizing the voices of their leaders even if they only had direct command over a small territory; in contrast, the Shī`ite quest for the genuine Imām probably made it harder for "lay" members of the movement to sketch out even a tentative theology. Of course, all of this is mere speculation on my part.